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a b s t r a c t
We investigate the impact of inequality on sharing and cooperation using a dictator game and a linear
public good game where some participants work for their endowment (‘‘workers’’) while others do
not (‘‘non-workers’’). Moreover, we differentiate between two types of inequality, namely in source
and in level. In contrast to most studies, participants are fully informed about the endowment of the
other players. The key finding of our paper is that both sharing and cooperation critically depend on the
source of the endowment. In particular, workers are more likely to share with other workers than with
non-workers and more inclined to contribute to the public good when grouped with other workers
rather than when grouped with non-workers. Considering also the choices made by non-workers, we
argue that the worker premium in sharing and cooperation is based on fairness considerations rather
than an in-group bias. Adding inequality in the level of endowment reduces the importance of the
source of endowment as driver of behavior. This also suggests that reducing one layer of inequality
may not improve cooperative behavior in society significantly, implying that a big-push policy tackling
many dimensions of inequality at the same time may be required.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Inequality is on the rise and there is a fear that this will lead
o a society with less sharing and less cooperation (Piketty, 2014;
iketty and Zucman, 2014; Putnam, 2000). We take this concern
o the lab and experimentally introduce inequality in source of
ndowment as well as in the level of endowment. In particular,
ome participants receive their endowment as compensation for
ork (‘‘workers’’) while others receive their endowment without
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be low, medium, or high. Subsequently, we let the participants
play a dictator game to measure sharing and a linear public good
game to measure cooperation in both homogeneous group and
heterogeneous group contexts.
The key finding of our paper is that workers are more will-
ing to share and cooperate with other workers than with non-
workers. This finding is robust to the inclusion of additional
dimensions of inequality, notably in the level of the endowment.
Moreover, we find that the co-worker premium in sharing and co-
operation is strongest in a setting without additional inequalities,
notably in the level of endowment, which we argue is likely to be
due to the reduced salience of work status as source of inequality
in a more complex environment. This also suggests that reducing
one dimension of inequality may not be very effective in terms
of stimulating sharing and cooperation, as it may simply increase
the salience of the remaining dimensions, a finding which may
have important policy implications.
We add to the experimental literature on group composi-
tion and cooperative behavior by considering both sharing and
rticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).


























































ooperation, by disentangling source and level of inequality,
nd by conducting the experiments in a setting of full infor-
ation.1 Indeed, most contributions in this literature analyze
ooperation in a setting where participants are not informed
bout the other group members’ source of endowment (Cherry
t al., 2005; Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2009; Buckley and Cro-
on, 2006; Eisenkopf et al., 2013). One exception is Oxoby and
praggon (2012) who show that, in a full-information setting,
he presence of minorities in a group is bad for cooperation. That
aper, however, does not disentangle source and level inequality,
nd does not consider sharing in a situation without minorities,
uch as the dictator game. Similarly, Cherry and Shogren (2008)
tudy sharing in a dictator game with full information, focusing
n whether the dictator’s endowment is earned or windfall, and
n the opportunity of the recipient (that is, whether or not the
ecipient had an opportunity to earn money). They find that
oth the source and the opportunity matter for decisions in a
ictator game. They do not, however, consider public good games
r the question of how cooperation or sharing is affected by
omogeneity or heterogeneity in group composition.2
Yet another innovation in our experiment is the fact that earn-
ngs from work are derived from a manual and tedious exercise
ather than from a cognitive task, where the latter is the typical
pproach in the literature. We believe this is important, as cogni-
ive tasks could activate unintended psychological processes that
onfound the causal effect of effort. Furthermore, participants
n most experiments are students, who may well have a ‘taste’
or cognitive activities, implying that such efforts can be seen as
ewarding rather than the opposite.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
escribes the experiment and the participants. Section 3 pro-
ides the results of the analysis and discusses mechanisms, and
ection 4 concludes.
. The experiment and the sample
The experiment involved 240 students at the University of
ari, Italy, who took part in nine separate sessions (including a
ilot) during two consecutive days.3 There was a gender balance
mong the participants and the average age was around 22 years.
he experiment was designed to test the effect of heterogeneity
n the source of endowment, as well as in level of endowment, on
ontributions in a public good game and dictator game. For this
urpose, a two-stage procedure was used. In the first stage, par-
icipants were randomly allocated to either a working session or
no-working session: in either case, the invitation to participate
n the experiment was identical.4 The working sessions consisted
f a 30-minute repetitive manual task (cutting strips of paper)
uring which the participants were not allowed to interact with
ach other but could observe that they all had to do exactly the
ame kind of task. The workers received a lump sum payment
1 Information about the endowment of the other group members may be
mportant, as shown by for instance Anderson et al. (2008) who find that
nequality (in the level of income) reduces public goods contributions, but
nly when endowments are known to all participants. Chan et al. (1999) also
mphasize the importance of information and communication for public goods
ontributions.
2 Our paper also relates to a literature on group identity and cooperation
Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Chen, 2011).
ypically, this literature finds that only the strongest treatments, including
ommunication and interaction, has an impact on team performance.
3 The experiments were conducted in Italian; see the online appendix B for
translated version of the experimental protocol.
4 Table A.1 in Appendix A gives sample size according to treatment, while
able A.2 shows that workers and non-workers are balanced on background
ariables.2
for their work, while the non-workers simply received a windfall
endowment.
In the second stage, the participants played a linear public
good game with three members in each group and with a mul-
tiplier of 50 percent, and a dictator game. As is well known, the
most efficient solution in the public good game is to contribute
everything to the common fund, but the Nash equilibrium, in the
absence of other-regarding preferences, is to contribute nothing.
We ensured that the participants understood the workings of the
game by numerical examples and explanations before they made
their choices. Similarly, transfers in dictator game are normally
ascribed to altruism.
The participants were placed in a situation where the group
members had the same source of income (homogeneous case)
and in a situation where they had different sources of income
(heterogeneous case). After the public good game, workers played
a dictator game where they made contribution decisions both
with another worker and with a non-worker. In both games
we randomly assigned the order in which the participants were
exposed to the homogeneous group and heterogeneous group
situations.
We randomly assigned participants to different endowment
levels in the public good game: low (9 euros), medium (15 euros),
and high (18 euros). For the workers, these endowments were
framed as compensation for their work, while no such framing
was given to the non-workers. In all groups, the sum of the
endowment was kept constant at 45 euros. For the dictator game,
all participants received a five euro ‘‘bonus’’ and asked to make a
transfer decision to another participant, identified by both source
and level of initial endowment.
We did not reveal the outcomes of the games during the work-
shop, and that payments were made individually and in sealed
envelopes at the end, based on earnings from one randomly




The main empirical question is how workers respond to
changes in the group environment. Accordingly, the analysis
focuses on the behavior of workers. However, we also present
evidence on non-workers in order to better uncover the key
mechanisms behind our findings.
There are 180 workers in our sample. They made decisions
both in the homogeneous group case and in the heterogeneous
group case. Using a within-subject design, this means that for
public good game we have 360 observations. For the dictator
game, the low and high endowment participants made contribu-
tion choices in four situations: when the recipient was low (nine
euros) or high (18 euros) endowment worker, and low or high
endowment non-worker. The medium-endowment workers (15
euros) only played against a similarly endowed worker and non-
worker. Hence, with information for one participant missing, we
have 598 observations in the dictator game. Our main regression
results are based on the following empirical specification:
Yi = α + β1W + β2Controls + εi. (1)
Here, Yi refers to either contributions in the dictator game or con-
tributions to the public fund in the public good game, while W is
a dummy which takes the value one if the worker is grouped with
other workers (homogeneous group) and zero if grouped with
non-workers (heterogeneous group). We run regressions both
without and with controls. Moreover, we run separate regressions














haring, cooperation and group composition.
Dictator game Public good game
All All Equal Unequal All All Equal Unequal

































Controls No Yes No No No Yes No No
Observations 598 598 120 478 360 360 120 240
Note: Estimation results from OLS-regressions on as transfers in the dictator game (in percent of endowment) and contributions in the public good game, defined
as contributions to the public fund (in percent of endowment), for the full sample (‘‘All’’), the equal endowment sample (‘‘Equal’’) and the unequal endowment
sample (‘‘Unequal’’). Co-worker is a dummy that takes the value one if the other group members are workers, and zero otherwise. Controls are Low endowment,
igh endowment, the order in which the games are played, the gender and age of the respondent, their grades from high school, and whether or not they lived at
he university campus. Standard errors in parentheses.
**p < 0.01.
*p < 0.05.
p < 0.1.Table 2
Cooperation, expectations and free riding, by endowment source and group composition.
Workers Non-workers
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Difference Homogeneous Heterogeneous Difference




































Note: The table shows contributions in the public good game, average expected contributions by the other group members, and
free riding, measured as Expected contributions minus public good game contributions, in an equal-endowment setting. The first
three columns show choices and expectations for workers, when grouped with other workers (Homogeneous), when grouped with
non-workers (Heterogeneous), and the difference between the two, from a t-test. Similarly, the three last columns show choices and
expectations for non-workers, when grouped with other non-workers (Homogeneous) and when the group also includes workers
(Heterogeneous), and the difference between the two, estimated by a t-test. Standard deviations in parenthesis, expect for the










for the equal endowment sample and the unequal endowment
sample in order to investigate whether the co-worker dummy is
larger or smaller in a setting with additional inequalities.5
There are 60 non-workers in our experiment. They played the
public good game both in the homogeneous group case and in the
heterogeneous group case, and hence we have a total of 120 ob-
servations for the non-workers. We use this information mainly
to shed light on mechanisms, comparing average contributions
to the public good for both workers and non-workers in different
group contexts, and also brining in expectations, as will become
clear in Section 3.3.6
3.2. Regression results
Table 1 shows the regression results on contributions by
workers in the dictator game and the public good game, as a
5 Table A.3 in Appendix A shows the full regressions including a complete
et of controls, as well as an interaction effect between the homogeneous group
ummy and indicators for low and high endowment. Given the panel dimension
f the data, we also present regressions using individual-level fixed effects,
hich does not change the key results.
6 In Appendix A we also report results from regressions on non-workers’
ooperation using model (1), see Table A.4. a
3
share of the endowment, without and with controls. Regressions
(1) and (2) are for the dictator game using the full sample,
while regression (3) is for the equal endowment sample, and
(4) for the unequal endowment sample. Similarly, regressions (5)
and (6) are for the public good game using the full sample, (7)
the equal endowment sample, and (8) the unequal endowment
sample.
Overall, the results in Table 1 show that contributions are
higher when workers are grouped with other workers than with
non-workers, as indicated by the positive and statistically signif-
icant coefficient on the Co-worker dummy (at the one-percent
level in the dictator game and at the five-percent level in the
public good game), which we refer to as a co-worker premium. The
ifferences are quantitatively significant and robust to the inclu-
ion of controls, as evidenced by regressions (2) and (6). Finally,
e observe that the co-worker premium is larger in a setting
ithout additional inequalities. This is evident from the fact that
he co-worker premium is larger in the Equal endowment sample
han in the Unequal endowment sample. We interpret this as
ork status reducing its salience as source of inequality when
dding new layers of inequality.













































.3. Mechanisms: fairness or group identity?
Our hypothesis is that the greater sharing and cooperation by
orkers when facing other workers, compared to when facing
on-workers, is based on fairness considerations: effort should be
ewarded, be it as transfers in the dictator game or contributions
n the public good game.
The main alternative hypothesis is that cooperation is driven
y group identity. We do not, however, believe that this is the case,
for two reasons. First, in the design of the experiment particu-
lar attention was devoted to minimizing participant interaction.
Second, and more importantly, we do not find evidence of such
an in-group bias among non-workers. We have information about
he choices and expectations of non-workers in the public good
ame. If cooperation was all about group identity, then we would
xpect non-workers to contribute more to other non-workers, or,
o the extent that windfall gains do not create any group feeling,
t least not more to members of the other group, namely the
orkers.
However, this is exactly what we observe, as summarized in
able 2. It shows contributions by workers and non-workers in an
qual endowment setting, comparing choices and expectations in
oth a homogeneous group situation and a heterogeneous group
ituation. For workers, the homogeneous group means grouped
ith other workers, while heterogeneous means grouped with
on-workers. For non-workers, homogeneous means grouped
ith other non-workers, while the heterogeneous case also in-
olves workers.7 The table also shows expected contributions by
he other group members in the various settings, and introduces
he concept of free riding, here defined as what the decision maker
xpects the other group members to contribute minus his or her
wn actual contribution.
Confirming what was already shown in Table 1, we observe
hat workers contribute more in the homogeneous than in the
eterogeneous group setting. Moreover, we observe that they
o so despite the fact that they believe that non-workers will
ontribute more. These two observations taken together imply
hat there is more free riding in the heterogeneous group case,
he difference being significant at the one-percent level.
For non-workers, however, we do not observe any own-type
remium. On the contrary: non-workers contribute less in the
omogeneous group case than in the heterogeneous group case
lthough the absolute difference in mean values is not statistically
ignificant. Interestingly, non-workers contribute on average less
hen matched with fellow non-workers despite the fact that they
xpect that these will contribute more, implying a significantly
arger degree of free riding when non-workers are matched with
heir own type, with the difference being significant at the five-
ercent level. In sum, these results indicate that cooperation is
ot primarily driven by an in-group bias, thus lending support
o what we consider to be the leading alternative explanation,
amely fairness considerations.
7 Non-workers were either grouped with two non-workers or with one non-
orker and one worker; the latter in order to be able to calculate aggregate
ontributions in a situation with one worker and two non-workers.4
4. Conclusion
We measure sharing and cooperation using a dictator game
and a linear public good game, randomly assigning some
individuals to endowment derived from work (‘‘workers’’) and
some to endowment without any effort (‘‘non-workers’’). More-
over, we experimentally introduce differences in endowment
levels. We find that workers are significantly more coopera-
tive and sharing when grouped with other workers than when
grouped with non-workers. Adding inequality in level of the
endowment reduces the co-worker premium of sharing and
cooperation, a fact we ascribe to the reduced salience of
work status as source of inequality in a more complex
environment.
In terms of mechanisms, we argue that the larger degree of
cooperation between workers is driven by fairness consideration.
Studying the behavior of non-workers, we find that they, too,
cooperate more, and free ride less, in a setting which also involves
workers than in a non-worker-only setting, suggesting that our
results are not driven by an in-group bias.
Our study analyzes individual behavior, but from a societal
perspective it is perhaps more important to understand the
impact of group composition on total public good contributions.
Based on the average contributions in the different settings,
we find that even though non-workers contribute more when
grouped with workers, this does not compensate for the loss
in contributions by the workers themselves when moving from
an all-worker group to a mixed group. In sum, therefore, our
study lends support to the concern that greater inequality in
society may be a threat to sharing and cooperation, but also that
there are not necessarily complementarities between the differ-
ent dimensions of inequality: adding one dimension, reduces the
importance of the other. A corollary of this finding is that if the
goal of policymakers is to boost cooperative behaviors, removing
one layer of inequality might not be sufficient: a big (equality)
push might be necessary.
Appendix A
Table A.1














K. Bjorvatn and N.D. Coniglio Economics Letters 197 (2020) 109619Table A.2
Balance workers and non-workers.
Full sample Workers Non-workers Difference
Male 0.529 0.517 0.567 −0.05
(0.5) (0.5) (0.499) (0.504)
Age 21.74 21.72 21.83 −0.11
(2.68) (2.83) (2.20) (0.77)
Grade 82.5 82.97 80.95 2.02
(11.87) (11.31) (13.41) (0.254)
University campus 36.2 35.0 40.0 −5
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48)
Observations 240 180 60
Note: Male is a dummy taking the value one if the participant is male and zero if female; Age is the participant’s age in years; Grade
refers to the grades at high school (0–100); University campus refers to whether the participant is a resident of one of the student
campuses. Standard deviations in parenthesis, except for Difference, where parenthesis shows standard errors.Table A.3
Sharing, cooperation and group composition, full specification.



































































































Observations 598 598 598 360 360 360
Note: Estimation results from OLS-regressions (columns 1, 2, 4, 5) and Individual Fixed Effects regressions (columns 3 and 6) on
transfers in the dictator game (in percent of endowment) and contributions in the public good game, defined as contributions to the
public fund (in percent of endowment). Co-worker is a dummy that takes the value one if the other group members are workers,
and zero otherwise; High endowment is a dummy that takes the value one if the participant has received the high endowment,
and zero otherwise; Low endowment is a dummy that takes the value one if the participant has received the low endowment,
and zero otherwise; Co-worker and High endowment is the interaction between Co-worker and High endowment; Co-worker and Low
endowment is the interaction between Co-worker and Low endowment; Male takes the value one if the participant is male, and zero
if female; Age is the participant’s age in years; Grade refers to the grades at high school (0-100); University campus refers to whether
the participant is a resident of one of the student campuses; Order is a numerical variable which indicates the order of the games






























































Observations 120 120 120 120
Note: Estimation results from OLS-regressions (columns 1, 3, 4) and an Individual Fixed Effects regression (column 2). The dependent
variable is contributions in the public good game, defined as contributions to the public fund (in percent of endowment). The












ppendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
nline at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109619.
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